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In a typical pop-out task, there is one target and a varying number of distractor stimuli. Now
imagine a target-absent display in the context of a pop-out task: all items are identical, and it
is decidedly easy to conclude that all items in the display are distractors, precisely because
there is no target to select on that display. One may be tempted to say that, as far as
the attention system is concerned, these two types of distractors are the same: target-
present distractors and target-absent distractors. The present study proposes that this is
actually not the case. Target-absent distractors can sometimes produce inter-trial effects
that their close-cousins, the target-present distractors, cannot.We used a letters/numbers
categorical oddball task to demonstrate this difference. The results are interpreted in the
context of recent ﬁndings in cognitive neuroscience as well as cognitive modeling.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been substantial interest in studying inter-trial effects in
visual search experiments in which there is uncertainty as to what
the targetmight be on the next trial. For example, in oddball exper-
iments, participants must quickly decide which item is the visual
oddball and then make a response to it, such as saccade toward it
(e.g., Becker, 2008; Caddigan and Lleras, 2010; Tseng et al., 2014),
or respond to some attribute of the oddball that requires the tar-
get be scrutinized to some degree (e.g., Maljkovic and Nakayama,
1994; Ariga and Kawahara, 2004; Goolsby et al., 2005; Kristjáns-
son and Driver, 2008; Lamy et al., 2008; Lleras et al., 2008). In
this literature1, most often, there are two categories of stimuli
(e.g., Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1994; Ariga and Kawahara, 2004),
though sometimes three (e.g., Lleras et al., 2008) or four (e.g.,
Lamy et al., 2008) from which oddball and distractors are picked.
The categories are sufﬁciently visually distinct from each other as
to give rise to the phenomenonof pop-out.When set size ismanip-
ulated, reaction time (RT) to ﬁnd the target is either not inﬂuenced
by set size (e.g.,Wan andLleras, 2010) or sometimes decreaseswith
increasing set size (e.g., Meeter and Olivers, 2006). Some of the
initial interest in these oddball search inter-trial effects came from
the following apparent contradiction: if the oddball is a pop-out
(and by that we understood a stimulus with sufﬁcient bottom-
up salience as to capture attention automatically onto itself), why
should there be any inter-trial effects in an oddball task at all? How
can an automatic pre-attentive computation, such as the detection
1In the current article, we will be concerned with inter-trial priming where there
is complete certainty as to what visual dimension or category will deﬁne the target
in the visual search task. There exists a different type of inter-trial priming where
there is uncertainty in that regard, the so-called dimension priming. In those cases,
participants do not know ahead of a trial which feature dimension they should
monitor for the presence of a target: the target can be an oddball by color in one
trial, and by orientation the next. We discuss this further in the General Discussion.
and automatic orienting toward of a pop-out, be improved upon
by simple repetition?
One hint that the answer to this question lies outside of the
domain of automatic, perceptual processing types of mechanisms
is the simple observation that no such inter-trial effects are ever
found when the task is not to orient to the target but simply to
detect the presence or absence of the oddball (e.g., Lleras et al.,
2008). That is, if these inter-trial effects arose from changes in the
manner in which features are perceived, or encoded or even rep-
resented at early stages of visual processing, then one would have
to predict that inter-trial effects would be observed irrespective
of the task that participants perform on the stimulus. If seeing,
for example, a red target amongst green distractors on trial N-1
facilitates the encoding of red items on trial N, then one would
expect that the detection of a red oddball on trial N should be
facilitated, yet it is not. It appears then that the priming effect
is not an advantage in detecting and reporting the presence of a
speciﬁc visual segmentation in the display (homogeneous display
vs. not) neither a matter of preferential encoding. Rather it arises
from the need to orient to one of the items in the display (the
oddball). The rub, though, is that participants donot know which
feature will determine target status on any given trial. Inter-trial
priming in this pop-out oddball tasks, thus, seems then unrelated
to the visual conspicuity of the target. In fact, the same magni-
tude priming effect is found when the two visual categories used
in the task are very different from each other (red vs. green) than
when they are very similar to each other (equiluminant fuschia
and pink colors), in spite of the fact that differences in feature
discriminability produce large changes in overall RT, with eas-
ier to discriminate pairs producing faster RTs (Wan and Lleras,
2010).
Two different types of inter-trial effects in oddball search
tasks have been documented: the so-called “priming of pop-out”
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effect (PoP, Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1994), and the “distractor-
previewed effect” (DPE, Goolsby et al., 2005). PoP is a reduction
in RTs when the oddball on a given trial is repeated on the
following trial. For instance, responses to a red-amongst-green
oddball on trial N will be faster if the oddball on trial N-1 had
also been red. Note that in PoP, there can also be repetition (or
not) of distractor stimuli across trials. In the previous example,
that would occur if on trial N-1 the distractors had been green.
Such repetitions can yield further reductions in RT (Kristjánsson
and Driver, 2008; Lamy et al., 2008). The DPE is measured in
experiments much like those measuring PoP with the difference
that target-absent trials (i.e., displays where items are all identi-
cal) are included in the series of events. For instance, responses
to a red target will be slower on trial N if trial N-1 had been a
target-absent trial in which all items were red, than when those
elements were of a different color (say green). This effect is
observed in both spatial and temporal [Rapid serial visual pre-
sentation (RSVP), measured as a drop in accuracy] search tasks,
and also, when both types of search tasks are interleaved (Lleras
et al., 2009a,b). Finally, it is worth noting that, compared to a
neutral baseline where no features repeat between trials, a DPE
is composed of: (1) a difﬁculty in orienting to a target recently
associated with distractor status (e.g., a target-absent diplay AAA
followed by a target-present display ABB is slower than a dis-
play absent display CCC followed byABB), and (2) a small but
reliable advantage at rejecting anew distractors that were recently
rejected (BBB->ABB is faster than CCC->ABB, see Lleras et al.,
2008).
It has been argued that one methodological advantage in study-
ing theDPE is that it is an effect associatedwith the change in status
of a single feature (e.g., Lleras et al., 2009a; Scalf et al., in press).
That is, because only one relevant feature can repeat from a target-
absent trial to a target-present trial (the feature shared by all
distractors in a target-absent trial), the effect is focused on that
single feature. Also, repetitions of irrelevant features also do not
produce a DPE: if the task is to report a color oddball, seeing a
display with items of identical shapes does not increase RT on
a subsequent trials for target of that same shape (Levinthal and
Lleras, 2008a). Thus, the DPE is a very focused and easily tractable
effect whereas PoP tends to be a more complicated phenomenon:
because more features can jointly impact performance across trials
(e.g., Michal et al., submitted; Huang et al., 2004; Kristjánsson and
Driver, 2008; Lamy et al., 2008). Somewhat surprisingly, the DPE
effect has been observed in several experiments in which the corre-
sponding PoP was not observed (Ariga and Kawahara, 2004). This
is somewhat puzzling because if priming in pop-out search can be
inﬂuenced both by repetitions of target and distractor status across
trials, one would imagine that it would be more easily observed
simply because there are more underlying sources of priming. It is
all the more puzzling when one considers that this single dissoci-
ation is observed in experiments with only two feature categories.
Say the categories are A and B. In the critical DPE sequence, we
would have a target-absent trial (for instance a display containing
AAA) followedby a target-present trial (ABB). Thiswould produce
a measurable difﬁculty (slowdown) in responding to the target (A)
on the second trial, because A has undergone a status change from
distractor (on trial N-1) to target (on trial N). Now consider the
corresponding PoP sequence. We have a target B surrounded byAs
on trial N-1 (BAA), followed by a display where A is surrounded
by Bs (ABB). As far as the history of A is concerned, the DPE and
PoP sequences are identical: in both cases A was tagged as distrac-
tor on trial N-1 and was tagged as target on trial N. Yet, on the
DPE sequence of trials (target-absent to target-present) an inter-
trial effect is observed, whereas, for certain visual categories (e.g.,
male/female oddball task and motion direction oddball task), the
corresponding PoP is not. We ask the question: why is this the
case?
The goal of the current paper is to provide a tentative ﬁrst
explanation for this asymmetry. The difference, we propose, is
on the emphasis of what is being actively tagged in both scenar-
ios, which reﬂects the different state of uncertainty in the two
tasks. On DPE sequences, there are trials where participants do
not respond, whereas on PoP sequences, participants respond
on every trial. If the task in an experiment is to select odd-
balls, target/oddball-absent displays represent a form of “failure”
in the human–environment interaction, because the environment
is not allowing participants to perform the stated goal (Lleras et al.,
2009a). As a result, in a target-absent trial the emphasis is placed
on categorizing the feature with a “distractor” tag, which is asso-
ciated with the “no-go” response2. Importantly, this assignment
occurs in the absence of other visual features. In contrast, on
target-present trials, the emphasis, we argue, is mostly on the
relative success experienced on the current trial (i.e., the act to
select, when the goal is to select). That is, because an easy-to-
select oddball is present, the emphasis is placed on tagging the
oddball’s feature as “target.” Importantly, the tagging of the dis-
tractor feature (not unimportant in magnitude, see Lamy et al.,
2008) we think comes as a consequence of the tagging of the tar-
get feature. Thus, in a display containing ABB, because A is easily
selected and tagged as target, B is then tagged as distractor. To
account for the single dissociation between the DPE and the PoP,
we suggest that, in PoP, because distractor tagging is dependent
on target tagging, visual categories that donot allow for easy tar-
get tagging cannot produce a PoP. In other words, if the target
does not pop-out, the target feature will not be tagged, and as a
consequence, neither will the distractor feature. Therefore, there
will be neither a target tag nor a distractor tag in place to inﬂu-
ence performance on the subsequent trial. In other words, no PoP
can be observed. In contrast, in the DPE, distractor tagging on
target-absent trials occurs in the absence of target tagging. It is an
integral part of terminating attentional engagement on the trial.
Therefore, this distractor tag is put in place on target-absent trials
and can then impact the allocation of attention in the subsequent
trial, resulting on a measurable inter-trial priming effect (i.e, the
DPE).
To test our differential-tagging hypothesis, that is, that target-
present distractor tags are not the same as target-absent distractor
tags, we compared performance on PoP and DPE with visual cate-
gories that are relatively similar in terms of low-level features. This
2To be clear, the DPE is not dependent on whether participants execute a response
or not on target-absent trials (e.g., Lleras et al., 2008). What we emphasize here is
that, on target-absent trials, attention does not get to “go” toward a target, and that’s
what attention is trying to do on each trial.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 669 | 2
Lleras and Buetti Not all distractor tags are created equal
allowed us to equate possible confounds with low-level differences
between categories that do or do not produce PoP. It had the added
beneﬁt that these two categories can sometimes produce pop-out
effects and sometimes not: a lettermay pop-out amongst numbers,
whereas the reverse may not be true (e.g., Brand, 1971; Jonides and
Gleitman, 1972). With the stimuli and conﬁgurations we used,
we found a search asymmetry: letters popped-out amongst num-
bers but the reverse was not true (Experiment 1). The presence
of this asymmetry allowed us to demonstrate, without changing
the task or the stimuli, a fundamental difference between tags
obtained in target-absent displays and those obtained in target-
present displays. Speciﬁcally, if tags on target-present trials require
the presence of a target, then we would predict that only when a
target pops out can PoP be observed. That is, we expected to ﬁnd
signiﬁcant PoP on trials where the target was a letter but not on
trials where the target was a number. In contrast, in the DPE,
the assignment of distractor tag does not depend on the pop-out
qualities of that stimulus because it is deﬁned on target-absent
trials (where pop-out is not happening). Thus, we expected to
ﬁnd DPEs both when letters were targets and when numbers were
targets. Moreover, because letters pop-out amongst numbers, we
also expected faster overall RTs on those trials, than on trials with
number targets. All of these predictions were conﬁrmed.
It is necessary to mention that the letter/number categorical
effects arenot always observed (e.g.,Duncan,1983; Krueger,1984).
That said, we were simply interested in the fact that, given that we
had obtained one with our speciﬁc set of stimuli, then this asym-
metry permits us to test our hypothesis of differential-tagging.
Experiment 1 documented the presence of the search asymme-
try with our letter/number stimuli, whereas Experiments 2 and 3
were designed to measure PoP and DPE, respectively, with those
stimuli.
Finally, an additional interest in using numbers and letters as
stimuli in the search task was to add further evidence to the cat-
egorical nature of the PoP and DPE effects. Lleras et al. (2009b)
have already demonstrated that a temporal DPE (using temporal
search through RSVP streams) could be observed using letters and
numbers as categories, but these categories have never been used
in PoP studies. Using such complex and visually similar categories
to deﬁne oddball status is interesting and theoretically valuable
because it allows us to minimize to the largest extent possible
sources of inter-trial priming arising from modulations of low-
level feature processing (so-called feature gain modulations, as
proposed by some authors Wolfe et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2009).
GENERAL METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants completed the experiments in exchange for course
credit in a psychology course. Eighteen completed Experiment
1, and twenty subjects each completed Experiments 2 and 3. We
used an inclusion criterion of 90% overall correct responses. This
accuracy cut-off reduced our sample to 15, 19, and 14 subjects,
respectively.
APPARATUS AND STIMULI
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch CRT monitors, controlled by
a Dell Optiplex PCs, using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard,
1997; Pelli, 1997). Stimuli could be letters (picked from the set
C D J K M R UW X) or single-digit numbers (all but zero) in Arial
font, ∼1.89◦ of visual angle tall. In Experiment 1, set-size was
manipulated, so there could be either 3, 4, or 6 items on a given
display. In Experiments 2 and 3 displays always had three equally
spaced items. Items were always presented along an iso-acuity
ellipse (Rovamo and Virsu, 1979) of ∼9.5◦ of visual angle across
the horizontal axis and8◦ across the vertical axis. To the right or left
of each character, we presented a small red square (0.28◦ tall). See
Figure 1 for an illustration of a sample display. The search display
contained a small dot in the center of the display and participants
were encouraged to keep their eyes at ﬁxation prior to the start of
the trial.
EXPERIMENT 1: LETTER-NUMBER SEARCH ASYMMETRY
The goal was to document the letter-number search asymmetry
with our stimuli and displays.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
There was an equal number of target-present (one oddball item)
and target-absent trials (no oddball). The oddball was equally
likely to be a letter or a number. And every set size was equally
likely on every trial. There were 50 repetitions for every pos-
sible combination of set-size, target presence and oddball type
condition.
Displays were presented until response. Participants were asked
to press the up-arrow key to report the presence of an oddball and
the down-arrow key to report the absence of one. There was a
variable inter-trial interval between 0.8 and 1.3 s. A 2 s delay was
imposed following incorrect responses during which the entire
FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of stimuli and conditions in
Experiments 2 and 3.Top Row: example of a Switch Search condition on
trial N. The category-oddball is a letter (X). Participants must respond Left,
because the X’s red dot is to the left of the X. Note that on trial N-1, letters
were associated with distractor status (the target was a number). Bottom
Row: example of a Target-Category Previewed Condition on trial N. The
category oddball is a number (4). On trial N-1, numbers were associated
with distractor status.
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display was blank. Participants were told that the best strategy in
the task was to keep their eyes at ﬁxation, though eye-movements
were not monitored.
RESULTS
Average accuracywas very high (96.9%), but nonetheless appeared
to vary by search condition, particularly in the number oddball
condition at high set sizes. To correct for the possibility of speed-
accuracy trade-offs in the search task, in addition to analyzing
correct RTs, we also computed search efﬁciency scores by dividing
RTs by the accuracy (in terms of proportion correct), for each
condition, for each participant.
The goal of the analysis was to evaluate the magnitude of the
search slope, on target-present trials with letter and number tar-
gets separately. To do so, we compared RTs between set sizes 6
and 3. First, we analyzed correct trials where letters were tar-
gets: there was no effect of set size on RTs, F(1,14) = 0.06, or
on efﬁciency scores, F(1,14) = 0.14. The average search slope
for letters amongst numbers was 3.6 ms/item. These results are
consistent with the hypothesis that letters pop-out amongst num-
bers. The same analysis on trials where numbers were targets
showed a marginal effect of set size on correct RTs, F(1,14) = 3.72,
p = 0.074. The effect of set size on efﬁciency scores was signiﬁcant,
F(1,14) = 5.48, p = 0.035. The average search slope for numbers
amongst letters was 14.4 ms/item, consistent with the hypothesis
that with our stimuli, numbers did not pop-out amongst letters.
Finally, we compared the magnitude of the search slopes against
each other, but the comparisons did not reach signiﬁcance in
either RTs (difference = 10.7 ms/item, t(14) = 0.68, p > 0.05)
nor efﬁciency score (difference = 14 ms/item, t(14) = 0.78,
p > 0.05).
DISCUSSION
The data from Experiment 1 showed that with our stimuli, we ﬁnd
a search asymmetry between letters and number stimuli. Letters
clearly popped-out amongst numbers, whereas the converse was
not true. We should add that the distinction that is critical for our
argument is whether there is evidence for “guidance” in one search
and not in the other. As guideline, we simply used the rule of
thumb that a search is “efﬁcient” (i.e., a pop-out or guided) when
its search slope is zero or near-zero (in the 0–10 ms/item range),
whereas it is considered to be inefﬁcient when it is different from 0
and numerically larger than 10 ms/item (e.g.,Wolfe and Horowitz,
2004).
EXPERIMENT 2: PRIMING OF POP-OUT AND
LETTER-NUMBER SEARCH ASYMMETRY
We used the same stimuli as in Experiment 1 in a priming of pop-
out task to test our hypothesis. As a reminder, we had predicted
that a PoP effect would be observed with letter targets but not
with number targets because priming of pop-out requires that
pop-out occurs in order to establish target and distractor tags.
Priming of pop-out is computed as the difference in RT between
two conditions: Switch Search RT (target-distractor assignment
switched from trialN-1 to trialN)minusRepeat SearchRT (target-
distractor tags remained the same from trial N-1 to trial N). For
example, the sequence LNN- > NLL is a Switch Search condition
and the sequence NLL->NLL is a Repeat Search condition. Note
that on both cases, the RT is evaluated on an identical display
(NLL).
METHODS
The methods were identical to those of Experiment 1 except where
noted.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
All trials contained a category oddball. There were a total of 500
trials. No time penalty was imposed following incorrect trials. On
average, there were 118 Repeat Search and 124 Switch Search trials
with letters as targets and 130 Repeat Search and 124 Switch Search
trials where numbers were targets. Participants were asked to ﬁnd
the oddball character in the display (letter amongst numbers or
number amongst letters) and report the location of the red dot
next to the oddball by pressing the left-arrow and right-arrow but-
ton, for left-side and right-side dots respectively. One additional
constraint was imposed on the stimuli: to ensure that we were
measuring inter-trial effects driven by categorical information,
characters never repeated from one trial to the next.
RESULTS
Average accuracy in this task was 95.4%. Not surprisingly, partici-
pants were more accurate on trials with letter targets (96.5%) than
with number targets (94.8%), F(1,18) = 9.10, p = 0.007. Similarly,
participants were more accurate on Repeat Search trials (96.2%)
than on Switch Search trials (95.0%), F(1,18) = 7.67, p = 0.013.
The interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1,18) = 0.037, p = 0.85.
Given these systematic changes in accuracy by condition, we ana-
lyzed both correct RTs and efﬁciency scores in this task to evaluate
the presence of a priming-of-pop-out.
We ﬁrst submitted correct RTs to a two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with factors target type (letter vs. number) and search
condition (switch vs. repeat). Overall, RTs were faster for letter tar-
gets than number targets, F(1,18) = 6.25, p = 0.022, and faster on
Repeat Search than on Switch Search conditions, F(1,18) = 7.10,
p = 0.016, but more crucially, these main effects were qualiﬁed
by a signiﬁcant interaction, F(1,18) = 11.49, p = 0.003. Planned
follow-up tests revealed that in fact, there was a signiﬁcant 61 ms
PoP observed on trials with letter targets, t(18) = 4.54, p< 0.001,
whereas there was no corresponding (−10 ms) PoP on trials where
numbers were trials, t(18) = −0.62, p = 0.54. Figure 2, top, illus-
trates these ﬁndings. Most importantly, given the concerns about
systematic changes in accuracy by search condition, we found
an identical pattern of results where search efﬁciency scores were
analyzed, with a signiﬁcant type by search condition interaction,
F(1,18) = 6.29, p = 0.022, with a signiﬁcant 79 ms PoP when
letters were targets (measured in efﬁciency score), t(18) = 4.47,
p< 0.001, and an non-signiﬁcant 11 ms PoP when numbers were
targets, t(18) = 0.62, p = 0.541 (see Figure 3).
DISCUSSION
The data from Experiment 2 conﬁrmed our predictions: we found
a clear and signiﬁcant priming of pop-out effect on trials were let-
ters were the target, but not on those where numbers were targets,
parallels the ﬁndings of Experiment 1 in which we found that, with
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FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiments 2 (Top) and 3 (Bottom). Correct
mean RTs are plotted as a function of target type (letter or number) on the
current trial and trial type: Repeat Search and Switch Search conditions, for
PoP in Experiment 2; and Distractor-Category Previewed and
Target-Category Previewed conditions, for DPE in Experiment 3. Error bars
indicate the standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 2. Efﬁciency scores are plotted as a
function of target type (letter or number) on the current trial and trial type:
Repeat Search and Switch Search conditions, for Priming of Pop-out. Error
bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
our stimuli and displays, letters pop-out amongst numbers while
the converse is not true. The critical question now is whether we
will ﬁnd a similar asymmetry with these stimuli in the Distractor
Preview Effect, or not.
EXPERIMENT 3: DISTRACTOR PREVIEW EFFECT AND
LETTER-NUMBER SEARCH ASYMMETRY
We used the same stimuli and procedures as in Experiment 2,
except that we incorporated into the design target-absent trials, so
that theDPE could be evaluated. As a reminder,we expected toﬁnd
a DPE both on trials where a letter is the target and on trials where
a number is the target. The Distractor Preview effect is computed
as the difference in RTbetween two conditions: the target-category
previewed condition RT (the target on trial N belongs to the cat-
egory of items present in the preceding target-absent trial) minus
the distractor-category previewed condition RT (the distractors
on trial N belong to the same category as the distractors on the
preceding target-absent trial). For example, the sequence NNN-
>NLL is a target-category previewed condition, and the sequence
LLL- > NLL is a distractor-category previewed condition. Again,
the effect is measured on identical displays (performance on trial
NLL).
METHODS
Methods were identical to those of Experiment 2, except were
indicated.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Trials with no category oddball were included in the trial sequence.
To ensure sufﬁcient trials were observed in each of the experimen-
tal conditions, and in agreement with previous DPE papers, 80%
of trials were paired into target-absent followed by target-present
trial sequences. The remaining 20% of trials were divided into
10% of target-absent followed by target-absent trials and 10%
of target-present followed by target-present trials. The trial pairs
were randomly shufﬂed for each subject to produce the sequence
of events in the experiment. Of the 80% of trial pairs designed to
evaluate the DPE, there was an equal amount of trials with letter
targets and with number targets in the target-present trial, and
there was an equal amount of trials with letter distractors in the
target-absent trials as target-absent trials with number distractors.
Finally, target-absent displays were presented only for 600 ms and
participants were asked to withhold any responses on those trials.
RESULTS
For entirely unanticipated reasons, many subjects had difﬁculty
in this task and had to be excluded from the analysis. This
may have been due to the introduction of target-absent dis-
plays (which require withholding of responses), but also, we
suspect, to the time of year where the subjects were run (near
the end of the semester). The accuracies of the rejected subjects
was low sometimes spectacularly so, for such a relatively easy
task (79, 78, 74, 54, 64, and 79%). In comparison, the over-
all average for the remaining subjects was 94.6%. Accuracy on
DPE trials (target-present trials preceded by a target-absent dis-
play) was analyzed in a two-way ANOVA with factors target type
(letter vs. number) and trial type (target-category previewed vs.
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distractor-category previewed). Accuracy was signiﬁcantly better
on trialswith letter targets (94.8%), thanon trialswithnumber tar-
gets (91.2%), F(1,13)= 11.35, p = 0.005. Similarly, responses were
more accurate on distractor-category previewed trials (94.0%)
than on target-category previewed trials (92.0%), F(1,13) = 8.29,
p = 0.013. The target-type by trial type interaction approached
but did not reach signiﬁcance, F(1,13) = 3.84, p = 0.072. Given
these systematic changes in accuracy by condition, we analyzed
both correct RTs and efﬁciency scores in this task to evaluate the
presence of a DPE.
We ﬁrst submitted correct RTs to a two-wayANOVA with target
type and trial type as factors. RTs were faster when letters were tar-
gets than when numbers were targets, F(1,13) = 7.98, p = 0.014.
Further, RTs were slower on target-category previewed trials than
on distractor-category previewed trials, F(1,13) = 8.25, p = 0.013,
and there was no hint of a target type by trial type interaction,
F(1,13) = 0.18, p = 0.67. In other words, we obtained a signiﬁcant
DPE effect for both target types, and this effect was not mod-
ulated by trial type (see Figure 2 bottom). That said, given the
concerns about accuracy, we ran the same analysis on efﬁciency
scores. These analyses corroborated the conclusions of the correct
RT analysis. The target type by trial type interaction failed to reach
signiﬁcance, F(1,13) = 2.28, p = 0.155. But importantly, even if
it had reached signiﬁcance, our speciﬁc hypothesis was not that
there would be no modulation by target category, but rather, that
a signiﬁcant DPE would be observed both when letters were tar-
gets and when numbers were targets. Planned follow-up analyses
conﬁrmed this. With letter targets, there was a 51 ms DPE in RT,
t(13) = 2.07, p = 0.059, and a 66 ms effect measured in efﬁciency
score, t(13) = 2.196, p = 0.047. More critically, and unlike what
we observed in Experiment 2 in PoP, with number targets, there
was a 66 ms DPE in RT, t(13) = 2.26, p = 0.042 and a 140 ms effect
measured in efﬁciency score, t(13) = 2.67, p = 0.019.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 3 conﬁrmed our hypothesis. First, we
obtained a signiﬁcant DPE on trials where the target was a letter.
Presumably everyone would expect such a result, given that let-
ters pop-out amongst numbers, and that a signiﬁcant PoP effect
was observed for this category of stimuli in Experiment 2. More
crucially, on trials where the target was a number, we obtained sig-
niﬁcant inter-trial priming (aDPE) even thoughno corresponding
inter-trial priming was observed when numbers were targets in
Experiment 2 (no PoP). This pattern of results conﬁrm the pres-
ence of a single dissociation between PoP and DPE, that suggests
that there is something unique to the “distractor” tags that are put
in place in the DPE, which is quite different from the distractor
tags that are at play in PoP.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The goal of this paper was to examine one possible reason why,
with the same stimuli, one may be able to observe a DPE, when
the corresponding PoP is non-existent. This question is important
because it speaks to the issue of target-distractor role assignment,
which presumably drives many inter-trial effects in search, like
PoP and the DPE. We proposed that the circumstances through
which the tagging is done affects whether an inter-trial effect will
be observed or not. The big contrast, of course, is that in PoP trials,
when there is an obvious target (i.e., the pop-out), the presence
of this item in the display drives the target-distractor tag assign-
ments. That is, because a pop-out is found, whatever feature was
responsible for deﬁning that oddball gets quickly and easily tagged
as target, and as a result of this tagging, the other feature present
in the display is tagged as associated with distractor status. Thus,
we proposed that when there is no pop-out on trial N-1, there can
be no priming on trial N. In contrast, in the DPE the distractor tag
that is activated on trial N-1 occurs not because of the presence of
an oddball in the display, but because of its absence. The attention
system fails to ﬁnd a feature to select in the display (because there
is none) and associates the feature that is visible with this absence
of selection, i.e., a distractor tag. Because this tag exists, then it can
modulate performance on trial N.
The data presented here was consistent with our differential-
tagging hypothesis. Using the number/letter search-asymmetry,
we showed that when a display produced a pop-out, an inter-trial
effect was observed (i.e., when letters were targets), and when
a display failed to produce a pop-out, no inter-trial effect was
observed. Note that the advantage of using a search asymmetry is
that we could see both types of search performance (pop-out and
somewhat inefﬁcient search) with the same stimuli, and thereby
avoid confounds that would occur when analyzing PoP across very
different types of stimuli (say comparing the presence of PoP with
color pairs and the absence of PoP with male/female oddballs). In
contrast, we did observe a reliable DPE with both types of target
categories.
One further reason to believe that distractor tags on target-
absent displays are different from distractor (and target) tags
on target-present displays comes from a recent functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) study by Scalf et al. (in press).
In that study, the authors used a categorical oddball task with
houses and faces as the two categories. Most critical, they found
regions of the brain in what is traditionally considered to be
the ventral attention system (VAS, such as the right middle
frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, and right supramarginal
gyrus) to be more active on target-category previewed trials
than on distractor-category previewed trials. That is, evidence
was consistent with the idea that the VAS was sensitive to dis-
tractor tags from a preceding target-absent trial. Speciﬁcally,
this increased activation suggested that it was harder to direct
attention toward the oddball on target-category previewed tri-
als than on distractor-category previewed trials. In contrast, the
one previous fMRI study of PoP (Kristjánsson et al., 2007, who
used a color pop-out task) had found that the PoP was mostly
observed in brain regions in the dorsal attention network (DAN)
like the frontal eye ﬁelds (FEFs) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS).
Thus, the simple dissociation that we observed here between
PoP and DPE with number targets is consistent with the ﬁnd-
ing that there seems to be a neural dissociation between these two
effects.
One question that our design cannot clearly address is whether
the DPE observed on number-target trials is driven by a cost
associated with the role-reversal of the number category (i.e.,
a slow-down in the target-category previewed condition) or by
an advantage due to the repetition of a consistent role for the
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letter category (i.e., a facilitation on distractor-category previewed
condition). Let’s compare the two conditions. The DPE when a
number is a target is measured as faster RTs on the sequence LLL-
> NLL than on the sequence NNN- > NLL. Therefore, the DPE
could be due to the fact that, given that letters are relatively salient
(they pop-out), that perhaps when letters are tagged as distractors
(LLL) and they re-appear on the subsequent trial as distractors
(NLL), that these stimuli will be more easily discarded as potential
targets and attention will more easily move toward the number
oddball, producing an RT advantage.
The alternative, of course, is that the effect is actually driven
by the switch in role of the number category: when numbers are
tagged as distractors (NNN), it may be all the more difﬁcult to
select a number on the subsequent trial (NLL), even if numbers
are not particularly powerful pop-outs amongst letters. This alter-
native would be in keeping with the fact that, in general, most of
the DPE is observed as a difﬁculty in orienting toward a recently
tagged-as-distractor feature (e.g., Lleras et al., 2008, 2009b; Caddi-
gan and Lleras, 2010). This account is also consistent with the fact
that in Experiment 3, the slowest conditionwas the target-category
previewed condition with number targets, as if participants had
suffered both from numbers being harder to select, overall, and
further, from an additional bias against selecting numbers. It
is also consistent with the results of Experiment 2, which sug-
gested that the effects obtained with these displays are driven by
the history of the current target: only when a letter was repeated
across consecutive trials was there an inter-trial effect (a beneﬁt)
observed.
What is clear from our data is that, in two-feature oddball
tasks, for a DPE to be observed, it is sufﬁcient that one of the
two visual categories used in the task produces pop-out, whereas
they suggest that for a PoP to be observed both categories must
produce a pop-out. Thus, it may be that in the published examples
where DPEs are observed, but corresponding PoP were not (as in
Ariga and Kawahara, 2004), it may be due to a feature asymmetry
in the category pair used for stimuli in that experiment, where
only one of the two features in the pair systematically produced
a pop-out3. Of course, this is but one possibility. There may very
well be others, perhaps related to other (not low-level) differences
with the stimuli used.
ATTENTION DECISION-MAKING TASKS
Recently, Tseng et al. (2014) proposed that pop-out oddball tasks
can be understood as attention decision-making tasks. Let us take
the example of a color oddball task, with red and green color
categories. The authors proposed that it is precisely because par-
ticipants do not know which color is associated with target status
(i.e., which color deﬁnes the oddball) and which with distractor
status, that priming arises. On every trial, there is the need for
a decision, and this decision is primed by recent trials. Shifting
the emphasis away from perceptual processing, the authors thus
modeled inter-trial priming as one does simple decisions (like
two-alternative forced choice tasks), with one difference. The goal
of the decision-making stage is not to arrive at an overt decision
3Wan and Lleras (2010) published evidence that no DPE is found in inefﬁcient
search tasks when neither category pops-out (average slope of 22 ms/item).
(which button to push), but rather to arrive at a covert decision:
which color, in the current display, is associated with target sta-
tus. Once a decision is reached, selection ensues and eventually, a
response to the item is overtly measured. Note that the decision
was not “which item (of the three items in the display) is the tar-
get,” but rather, the decisions pertained to the role of the visual
categories that deﬁned the oddball task. This attention decision-
making stage is therefore in charge of mapping the two colors in
the display (red and green) to the two roles in the task (target and
distractor). Once that is achieved (say, red is found to be asso-
ciated with target status), orienting to the corresponding item in
the display is easy, given the conspicuity of the oddball. Within
this framework, inter-trial effects arise as biases to maintain the
same target/distractor to colors mapping as those established on
preceding trials. That is, the inter-trial effects are best modeled
as changes to decision boundaries. For instance, if on trial N-1,
green was associated with distractor status, on trial N the decision
boundary to decide that green is associated with target status is
heightened, delaying selection of targets that happen to be green
on trial N.
From this attention-decision making perspective, the current
results suggest that the “decisions” made by the attention system
are different on target-present and target-absent trials. This can-
not be easily determined when only two features are used in the
search task and both produce pop-out effects [as in Tseng et al.’s
(2014) study and many of the early PoP studies]. Proposing that
attentional decisions are different on target-present and target-
absent trials is not a new concept. In fact, much of the literature
on visual search has always treated differently these two types of
trials, where special “termination” rules are said to apply to target-
absent trials, simply because on those trials no single stimulus
compels an action, and therefore the end of the trial (e.g., Wolfe,
1994; Wolfe and Van Wert, 2010). All that being said, we want
to be clear that what we propose is not that the distractor tags
are implemented in different ways in target-present and target-
absent trials. The implementation of those tags is likely identical
(see Tseng et al., 2014). But rather, what we argue is that the man-
ner in which one arrives at those tags is different in these two
scenarios.
Incidentally, from this attentional-decisionmaking perspective,
it is easy to make sense of a curious result in the PoP literature:
some experiments have measured the magnitude of the inter-trial
effects with varying set sizes and found that both RTs and the mag-
nitude of the inter-trial effect decrease with increasing display set
size (e.g., Bravo and Nakayama, 1992; Meeter and Olivers, 2006).
This makes sense: the more items in the display there are, the faster
a decision can be made regarding which color is associated with
distractor status on that trial (the more distractors, the more evi-
dence there is on the display regarding their color being the color
associated with distractor status). This faster distractor-decision
time produces a reduction in overall RT, as well as reduces the
room to observe effects from recent status history.
Understanding inter-trial priming as a decision-makingprocess
also allows us to more easily understand the presence of analogous
effects in temporal search tasks, where items are presented one
at a time, rather than all at once, as in traditional spatial search
tasks. In Lleras et al. (2009b), the authors presented participants
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with RSVP streams of colored letters and asked them to report the
case (upper or lower) of the oddball colored letter. They found
that selecting a color oddball in the stream was extremely difﬁ-
cult, if that color had been associated with distractor status on
the preceding trial. This effect was only evident when the oddball
appeared early in the stream, evidence that as the stream pro-
gressed, participants were actively changing the target-distractor
assignments to the appropriate colors on the trial. As with spatial
search tasks, detecting the presence of a color oddball produced
no inter-trial effects. Once again, those results suggest that the
decision to orient to (or select in time) one item amongst others is
where the priming effect is taking place. Finally, in Levinthal and
Lleras (2008b, also reported in Lleras et al., 2009a; see also Yashar
and Lamy, 2010 for converging evidence with PoP), the authors
showed that the target-distractor “tags” are independent of the
search task in which they are created. The authors inter-mixed
RSVP trials with spatial search trials and showed that inter-trial
effects were observed to equal extents when participants com-
pleted two trials of the same type of search (spatial search followed
by spatial search or RSVP search followed by RSVP search) than
when participants switched tasks across trials (spatial search fol-
lowed by RSVP search of RSVP search followed by spatial search).
These ﬁndings are important because (a) they suggest a common,
high-level locus to the target/distractor decision process; (b) they
further suggest that these inter-trial effects are unrelated to mod-
ulations of the oddball’s conspicuity; and (c) they demonstrate a
certain degree of commonality between the mechanisms in charge
of selecting information in time with those selecting information
in space.
RELATION TO OTHER FORMS OF INTER-TRIAL PRIMING
In this paper, we have proposed a possible reason for the asymme-
try that exists between two forms of inter-trial priming: PoP and
the DPE. We proposed that this asymmetry is related to the fact
that in order to observe PoP, the target needs to pop-out from the
search display, whereas this is not a requirement for the DPE. That
said, we are not claiming that target-centered inter-trial priming
can only occur when the target pops-out. Below, we review other
forms of inter-trial priming and we discuss how they relate to our
current ﬁndings.
In the so-called dimension-priming paradigm, ﬁrst reported by
Müller et al. (1995, see also Found and Müller, 1996; Olivers and
Meeter, 2006), the target is deﬁned as an oddball in one of several
possible feature dimensions. For instance, on trial N, the target
might be a color oddball, whereas on trial N+1, the target could
be an orientation oddball. In these types of tasks, participants do
not know a priori which dimension of the display to scrutinize on
any given trial. As noted by Olivers and Meeter (2006) the pattern
of results obtained in these circumstances is somewhat different
from the one observed in cases where there is no dimension uncer-
tainty, i.e., when participants know a priori what dimension of the
display deﬁnes the presence of a target, as with PoP and the DPE.
When there is dimension uncertainty, priming is often stronger
and more robust in present/absent tasks (i.e., it is easier to notice
the presence of the oddball in the display if the oddball occurs
along the same dimension on consecutive trials) than on com-
pound task (reporting which color or orientation was the oddball
on a given trial). In contrast, when there is dimension certainty
the opposite pattern is observed: inter-trial priming occurs when
participants are asked to report speciﬁcs about the target oddball
(e.g., which side of the color is missing?) but no inter-trial priming
is observed when participants are asked to report whether or not
there is an oddball in the display (Lleras et al., 2008).
Müller et al. (1995) [as well as Olivers and Meeter (2006)]
argued that in cases of dimension uncertainty the precise feature
repetition is less important because the system is set up at a higher
level to be sensitive to the larger change (dimension change) than
to the speciﬁc one (which feature within a dimension). There is
also a large literature showing that feature-based pop-out depends
on top-down goals (i.e., knowingwhich dimension requires exam-
ination/focus). For instance, in the context of PoP, Fecteau (2007)
found that in the typical PoP task of Nakayama, there was no
priming for the unattended dimension. Our lab has shown this
as well in the DPE (Levinthal and Lleras, 2008a). So, it appears
that when there is dimensional uncertainty (i.e., when observers
donot know which dimension of the stimulus will contain the
target), detecting a repetition vs. alternation of dimension across
trials is what is most important because the dimension sets for that
trial the goal of focused attention. Notice too that, in the case of
dimension uncertainty, biasing attention toward a speciﬁc feature
repetition (say, red) affords little advantage to the viewer if there
is no guarantee whatsoever that red (or even color in general) will
produce a contrast on the following trial (because the next target
could be deﬁned as an orientation singleton). In contrast, when
dimensions are certain, there is a goal for focused attention and
there are “savings” to leave the biases in place from one trial to the
next (Tseng et al., 2014). In sum, it is likely that priming under
dimension uncertainty behaves quite in a different way that prim-
ing under featural uncertainty (but dimension certainty). It would
be interesting to test with modeling whether dimensional prim-
ing can also be understood as a priming within a decision-making
framework,with the goal beingdeterminingwhichdimension (not
which speciﬁc feature) ought to be inspected on a trial-by-trial
basis.
There is, of course, different levels of processing that may ben-
eﬁt from repetitions which would lead to inter-trial priming. This
was best discussed by Ásgeirsson and Kristjánsson (2011), who
showed that sometimes priming in visual search may arise from
retrieval of episodic memories (or traces) of a preceding trial (see
also Huang et al., 2004). Simply put, the current trial context
facilitates retrieval of that episodic memory (when the context
match across trials is high) and this in turn facilitates the latter
stages of perceptual processing of the target object as a whole
(see also Kristjánsson and Campana, 2010; Lamy et al., 2010).
This form of priming has different characteristics than feature-
based inter-trial priming. For example, feature-based priming
applies to one speciﬁc feature (the attended feature) and does
not extend to the unattended feature (see Fecteau, 2007; Levinthal
and Lleras, 2008a; or only modestly, see Michal et al., submitted).
Further, the beneﬁt extends across the whole ﬁeld to all objects
who share that feature. Episodic priming is also mainly observed
in difﬁcult/inefﬁcient search tasks, whereas feature-based prim-
ing seems to require efﬁcient search (as suggested by the current
results).
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CONCLUSION
The inter-trial effects known as Priming of Pop-out and the Dis-
tractor Preview Effect are, at face value, quite similar: they reﬂect
the effects that switching or repeating target/distractor roles across
trials can have on performance. In spite of this descriptive similar-
ity, there is a deep difference between the two. The current results
suggest that the manner in which the attention system arrives at
those tags, and more speciﬁcally, at the distractor tag, is funda-
mentally different across the two phenomena. Assigning a visual
category the status of distractor because attention easily detected
the presence of a target (belonging to a separate category) does
not appear to have the same effects (or to be processed neurally
the same way) as assigning a status of distractor to a category
because attention was “unable” to ﬁnd a visual category that could
be tagged as target. Additionally, the current study demonstrated
the existence of PoP and DPE with fairly complex visual categories
(numbers and letters) which have similar low-level characteris-
tics, isolating the locus of the difference between these effects at
a relatively high-level of processing. Finally, the study proposed
one possible reason why DPEs may be observable with category
pairs that do not allow for a PoP to emerge: it appears that PoP is
only observable when both categories are capable of producing a
pop-out effect, whereas for the DPE, having just one category that
pops-out seems sufﬁcient.
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